

OSD Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

SECRET (When Filled In)

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ	OO	Contacts		DATE: C. 1918-1945
Global	DOD	Industry		
		Interrogations		
		Overseas Reports		
		Military intell		
				CLASS.: S
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				NO.:
File folder titled OO/C Predecessors (1918-1945)				LOCATION: HS/HC-118 ✓

ABSTRACT

This file contains: comments on commercial liaison activities (1918-1922), a list of firms and corporations for contact, questioning of civilian's policy memoranda, a list and description of good industrial contacts in New York (1921), publication letters and other information received from various firms, memoranda on foreign positive intelligence for the military services, and a published booklet entitled "Instructions to Custodians and Users of Current Requests for Information" which is a list of questions and requests for material by the Military Intelligence Services from places all over the world.

FORM 2523 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

HISTORICAL STAFF SOURCE INDEX

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(13-18)

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Notes on Commercial Liaison activities 1918-1922.

1. Questionnaires were voluminous and varied; very often the questions asked covered topics that ~~were~~ had little to do with the activities of the contact concerned.
2. It was apparently the policy not to ask questions on the "oil situation" from an oil company, etc. This seems illogical as the best sources of any type of information are those who are directly involved with it. Proper protection for the sources and the information itself should eliminate the hesitancy to contribute and efforts should be made to collect "oil information" from oil companies, "copper information" from copper companies, "shipping information" from shipping companies, etc.
3. G-2 "estimates" were sent to commercial contacts for criticism and information; other information was also given, sometimes specially collected, for the particular benefit of the commercial contact. THE WISDOM OF ADPTING THIS POLICY IN CURRENT OPERATIONS IS DOUBTFUL. Is it necessary for the War Department to "trade" information with its own people in order to obtain their assistance in strengthening national defence?
4. The old system was to obtain the names of the foreign representatives of the commercial firms contacted and then ~~to~~ have our M/A's get in touch with them in the field. This is not good as it gives knowledge of the system to too many people. Believe we should receive our information from the home office only. Any contacts between M/A's and American citizens in the countries where they are located can be carried on in the normal manner and will have nothing to do with this system.
5. From the old correspondence, it is apparent that the foreign representatives of American firms are not always American citizens. If contacts were limited to the head of the firm involved and information received from them, it would make no difference whether the information came from a non-citizen or not as he would not know that it was going to MIS.

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